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INTRODUCTION 
Little did I know as I moved from Oregon to 
Massachusetts in 1988 that I would soon be witness to 
one of the most complex and expensive megaprojects 
in North America. Actually, I’d never heard of the term 
“megaproject,” a point of ignorance I shared with most 
of the planet’s population. I’ve since found that experts 
in the field define a megaproject as a publicly funded in-
frastructure project that costs in excess of a billion dol-
lars and requires more than a decade to plan, design, and 
construct. Boston’s $15 billion Central Artery/Third 
Harbor Tunnel (CA/T) Project still hits the top of the 
chart for cost and complexity on the list of megaproj-
ects undertaken in the last two decades of the twentieth 
century. The CA/T Project provides a rich laboratory 
for studying the inner workings of these mammoth and 
costly undertakings. 
My 13-year stint in the Massachusetts Office of the 
Inspector General would expose me to many things, in-
cluding the interior machinations of planning, designing 
and constructing Boston’s CA/T Project. In fact, then 
Inspector General Joseph Barresi and his First Assistant, 
Steve Cotton, eventually tasked me with creating a 
multidisciplinary team to monitor what would become 
known as the “Big Dig” project. I soon learned that the 
structural and civil engineering aspects of the project 
paled in comparison to the political and social engineer-
ing that was needed to sustain momentum toward 
completion. Now, 20 years after my first introduction to 
the Big Dig, I still marvel at the audacity of the project 
champions. I hope that, by the end of this article, I’ve 
succeeded in peeling back some of the layers of the Big 
Dig’s complexity and piquing the reader’s interest in 
the megaproject phenomenon.
ON MEGAPROJECTS AND THE BIG DIG 
Across the nation, taxpayers (and toll and rate-
payers) pump billions of dollars into public works 
megaprojects. The projects range in type and location 
from the Alameda Corridor (Los Angeles, California) 
to the Denver International Airport (Colorado) to 
the Woodrow Wilson Bridge (connecting Virginia, 
Maryland, and DC). Beyond our borders, we marvel 
at the $16 billion 30-mile English Channel Tunnel and 
the Chinese government’s $25 billion dollar hydroelec-
tric dam project on the Yangtze River. But the Big Dig 
project holds its own in the megaproject hall of fame, or 
infamy, as the case may be.
Although Bostonians may think of the Big Dig as one 
unified project, it is actually three separate projects 
rolled into one by the vagaries and vision of public 
officials seeking advantage in the politics of the federal 
transportation appropriations process. The Big Dig 
boasts three related but distinct design and construc-
tion projects:  
•Bridging the Charles River 
with an asymmetrical cable 
stay structure (The Leonard P. 
Zakim-Bunker Hill Memorial 
Bridge); 
•Reconstructing the downtown 
central artery (I-93) under-
ground and demolishing the old 
elevated artery; and 
•Extending the Turnpike (I-90) 
across Fort Point Channel 
through South Boston, and 
across Boston Harbor to Logan 
International Airport by way of 
a newly constructed (1995) immersed tube tunnel. 
Maintaining the impetus for the Big Dig required a 
prodigious display of political engineering that rivaled 
and surpassed the remarkable civil engineering expertise 
on display throughout the 7.5 mile stretch of roadway, 
bridge, and tunnel. According to state documents, the 
massive project was designed to improve traffic flow, 
safety, and air quality in one of the national’s oldest and 
most congested cities. Big Dig proponents also promised 
to promote economic development in the region. Some 
even describe the undertaking as a beautification project 
envisioned by transportation guru Frederick Salvucci 
mid-way through the twentieth century. 
Urban legend has it that former Secretary Salvucci was 
as a young man greatly disturbed by the treatment 
his immigrant grandmother endured at the hands of 
MassPike officials as they cleared the way for an urban 
highway earlier in the century. According to Thomas 
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P. Hughes, an avid megaproject historian, Salvucci’s 
grandmother was ordered to vacate her house in the 
Brighton section of Boston within ten days and never 
received fair compensation for her property or men-
tal anguish. Salvucci vowed not to follow the Robert 
Moses tradition of leveling neighborhoods in the name 
of progress. 
The Big Dig, a project funded by federal and stated 
monies (about 60/40), was substantially completed 
late in 2007 for nearly $15 billion. Informed observers 
question the definition of “substantially completed,” 
especially in light of the Boston Globe’s recent report of 
a 2,000-item list of things yet to be done on the project. 
That’s a far cry from statements in the mid-1980s when 
project managers estimated the cost at $2.6 billion and 
looked for completion some time toward the end 1998.
BIg DIg STakeHolDeR  
The list of people and organizations with a stake in the 
Big Dig would fill volumes—the business community, 
neighborhood organizations (North end, Chinatown, 
etc.), highways users, environmentalists, design and 
construction firms, property owners along the Big Dig 
corridor, and on and on. But few had a bigger stake in 
the project than four high-stakes players: 
•Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff (B/PB) the joint venture 
hired by the Commonwealth in 1985 to manage Big Dig 
design and construction; 
•Federal Highway Administration (FHWA—in the U.S. 
Department of Transportation), the federal funding 
agency for the Big Dig and many other highway proj-
ects across the United States; 
•Massachusetts General Court (the Legislature), which 
would be on the hook for funding whatever FHWA 
refused to pay; and 
•Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MassPike), the 
quasi-independent state entity that took over the Big 
Dig in 1997 from MassHighway and assumed responsi-
bility for maintaining the project into the future. 
The chart below—taken from the most recent mate-
rial available from MassPike (May 2007)—shows what 
funding sources pay how much of the Big Dig costs. In 
June 2000, under pressure from Congress, the FHWA 
dug in its heels and froze the amount it would pay 
toward the Big Dig at $8.549 billion. Today, that covers 
just under 60 percent of the 2007 project cost estimate 
of $14.798 billion. Various state revenue sources will 
pay about 40 percent of the total cost of the project—
far more than the 10–20 percent projected by project 
enthusiasts in the 1980s and 1990s.
Key evenTS in THe RiCH And TURBULenT  
HiSToRy oF THe BiG diG 
1970s and early 1980s. Massachusetts officials seek 
local support, federal funding, and environmental ap-
provals for the Big Dig
1985–1995. Commonwealth hires B/PB to manage the 
Big Dig and moves ahead on the megaproject
in the early 1980s, Transportation Secretary Fred 
Salvucci assigned responsibility for the Big Dig to the 
Massachusetts department of Public Works (MdPW—
later to be named the Massachusetts Highway 
Department), the department that was also responsible 
for overseeing the design and construction of road and 
bridge projects throughout the state. There appears to 
have been general, though not unanimous, agreement 
that if the project were to be undertaken, there was no 
alternative but to rely heavily on consultants to manage 
the megaproject under the Commonwealth’s direction. 
Transportation officials and some political leaders were 
concerned that scarce in-house resources would be di-
verted to the Big Dig from road and bridgework outside 
the Boston metropolitan area. Their concerns, shared by 
federal highway officials, buttressed the decision to rely 
heavily on hired expertise from the private sector.
in 1985, MdPW hired the joint venture of Bechtel/
Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade and Douglas (B/PB) to 
manage design and construction of what was then 
known as the Central artery/Third Harbor Tunnel 
Project. Between 1985 and 2006, the Commonwealth 
would pay B/PB more than $2 billion through a series of 
soUrces BY FUnding cumulative Budgeted Budgeted  Budgeted  totAL 
 Actual  sFY2007 sFY2008 sFY2009  
 through   and beyond 
 sFY 20061
Federal 6,913 135 0   0   7,049
gAns (grant anticipation notes)2 1,500 0 0   0   1,500
state Bond/notes 1,589 50 61 10   1,710
[state] transportation infrastructure Fund 2,337 0 121 25   2,482
Massport via state  301 0 0   0       302
turnpike Authority [Masspike] 1,401 47 4   0   1,451
state interest on MtA Funds 24 0 0   0        24
Masspike direct 81 59 0   0      140
insurance trust revenue 59 5 75   0      140
totAL 14,206 296 261 35 14,798
1 SFY=state fiscal 
year (July–June), 
which is different  




2 MassPike  
documents  
explain this  
funding nuance  
in more detail.
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eSTiMATeS, LieS, And CoST oveRRUnS 
Stunning increases in megaproject schedule and cost 
estimates have caused political observer David luberoff 
and others to pose a troubling question: is our political 
system so flawed that those who build infrastructure 
cannot tell the truth about costs? While i 
hesitate to pin the problem on our political 
system, there’s ample evidence that mega-
projects routinely exceed time and budget 
estimates trotted out by proponents when 
they’re pursuing public and legislative sup-
port. The Big Dig is no exception. Indeed, 
cynics could learn much from the Big Dig 
play book about creative accounting and 
financial manipulations.
2000–2001: deConSTRUCTinG THe TRUe CoST  
oF THe BiG diG 
In March 2001, State Inspector general (Ig) Robert 
Cerasoli issued a report to the Treasurer of the 
Commonwealth alleging that Big Dig officials had be-
ginning many years earlier deliberately misrepresented 
huge increases in Big Dig costs. Here’s an excerpt from 
the executive summary of the Ig’s report. “B/PB” refers 
to Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, the joint venture hired 
in 1985 to manage Project design and construction.
anxious to avoid the sticker shock effect of B/PB’s 
total cost estimate, Big Dig officials undertook a nine-
month initiative between June 1994 and March 1995 to 
decrease B/PB’s total cost estimate from $13.8 billion to 
$8 billion. at this time, the Secretary of Transportation 
and Construction publicly announced that the on-
time and on-budget figure would not exceed $8 billion. 
Documents cite a directive from Big Dig officials telling 
B/PB to “hit the target” of $7.98 billion. To hit the 
target, state, B/PB, and local FHWA officials began an 
extensive cost reduction initiative that consisted of the 
following:  
•Reducing every B/PB “to-go” contract estimate across 
the board—including material, labor and overhead—by 
a 13 percent “market discount” despite the recommen-
dation of B/PB officials by letter from the home office in 
San Francisco not to do so…. 
•Reducing every to-go contract estimate by eliminating 
the 18 percent contingency allowance for construction 
growth during design. 
•excluding all management costs from the estimate 
after the year 2002 [note that the management team did 
not close up operations until 2007!]…. 
•excluding more than $1 billion in costs defined as 
“non-project” costs. 
•Stating all estimates in 1994 dollars and excluded to 
go escalation (inflation costs) from the total cost. later, 
they insisted that the budget exclude all escalation  
since 1988….
open-ended consulting contracts to manage the project 
from stem to stern.
1996–1997: LeGiSLATURe CReATeS 





Public officials faced a 
major financial bind in 
the mid-nineties. By 
1996, about $4.7 billion 
had been obligated 
for the Big Dig—$4.1 
billion in federal funds 
(86 percent) and about $650 million in state funds. 
FHWA demanded proof that the Commonwealth 
would have the wherewithal to handle its part of the 
deal. The primary source for transportation funding in 
Massachusetts is state transportation bonds, supported 
by fuel taxes and other sources. Typically, the State has 
borrowed funds by issuing general and special obliga-
tion bonds. Proceeds from these bond issuances, which 
are authorized by the legislature through transporta-
tion bond bills, cover the State share of federal-aid 
projects, and pay for non-federally funded projects. 
in his cover letter to the Legislature, Governor William 
Weld noted that the MHS bill “answers the challenge 
set forth by the FHWA to implement a strategy for 
payment of the Commonwealth’s share of future Ca/T 
[Big Dig] Project costs by april 1, 1997.” The bill moved 
quickly through the legislature and the governor 
signed it on March 20, 1997. a companion transporta-
tion bond bill, passed by the legislature and signed into 
law by the governor in May 1997, ensured that funds 
would be available to cover the Big Dig cost, then esti-
mated at $10.8 billion. 
MassPike and MassHighway wasted no time entering 
into a management agreement, effective July 1, 1997, 
whereby MassPike would manage completion of the Big 
Dig, provided that MassHighway would continue to be 
the recipient state agency for federal funds and “remain 
fully liable for paying all costs of the Ca/T Project not 
otherwise paid from the $700 million to be paid” by 
MassPike. Shortly thereafter, Governor Weld resigned 
and Paul Cellucci, his lieutenant governor, stepped into 
the governor’s office, assuring the public that the Big 
Dig would come in on time and under budget under the 
continuing direction of James J. kerasiotes.
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More heads rolled; Governor Cellucci had already 
ousted James J. Kerasiotes, who was regarded by many 
as the primary instigator of this high-stakes shell game. 
Kerasiotes had arguably been responsible for the Big 
Dig for many years in various capacities, most recently 
as head of MassPike. Although little came of it, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission launched an 
investigation into whether Commonwealth officials 
deliberately misled bond-buyers when they failed to 
identify the magnitude of Big Dig liability in their  
bond prospectus.
Primarily as a result of their failed oversight on the Big 
Dig, FHWA issued a series of directives and cautions for 
megaproject oversight across the nation, demanding 
more detailed financial reports and ordering regional 
FHWA offices to keep a much closer eye on large trans-
portation projects in their districts.
ConCErnS LooM…AGAin 
Much of the Big Dig saga might have faded into the 
past except for the tragic death of a woman in July 2006 
when a falling ceiling tile in a connector tunnel killed 
Milena Delvalle who was driving with her spouse to 
Logan Airport in the early morning hours. The incident 
revived earlier concerns about accountability and over-
sight on the Big Dig, especially with respect to  
B/PB’s role in facility failures and cost overruns. 
recently, B/PB agreed to return about $400 million 
to the Commonwealth in a settlement agreement 
approved by U.S. Attorney Michael Sullivan and State 
Attorney General Martha Coakley. The Boston Globe 
reported that by settling in this matter, B/PB avoided 
criminal charges in the tunnel collapse and would thus 
not be disbarred from receiving future federal and state 
government contracts.
MEGAProJECT ovErSiGHT PoinTErS 
So what can we learn from these experiences? As 
a result of my work in the inspector General’s (iG) 
office and subsequent research—and the great advice 
of colleagues—i developed the following pointers for 
megaproject oversight leaders: 
•Budget oversight costs right along with the project. 
Funding for oversight efforts should be allocated as 
part of the basic project costs, just as one might budget 
for design costs, project office space, and staff. (The 
iG appealed to the Legislature for 1⁄10th of 1% of the 
estimated project costs in the early-mid 1990s, but even 
that modest amount didn’t fly.) 
•Start early. The earlier you weigh in on management 
systems, procurement procedures, and design issues, 
the more likely you are to be able to warn managers and 
policy makers off the rocks before big problems sail in. 
Put pressure on management to use such techniques as 
constructibility reviews and value engineering analyses 
during the design phase, rather than dealing through 
change orders with problems that could have been 
eliminated before construction (or product delivery). 
Early work increases the likelihood that management 
(and the iG) will be able to identify opportunities 
for cutting costs and ensuring a high quality facility, 
whether that facility be a multibillion-dollar highway or 
an interagency radio installation. 
•Go for major vulnerable “pulse” points. Do what 
internal auditors might do. Take a look at the man-
agement controls that are (or should be) in place. For 
instance, if funding sources require pre/post award 
audits on contracts (the feds usually do for professional 
service/consulting contracts), make sure the agency 
has that function in place. Develop a good relation-
ship with the agency’s internal auditors and outside 
funding agencies. They’ll tip you off to problems and 
opportunities. Also: watch out for proprietary specifi-
cations and sole-source contracts. These approaches, 
if selected, should be fully justified in writing on the 
basis of agency needs, noT the ability of one vendor or 
manufacturer to tilt the specs to their own advantage. 
AnD: assess the overall “control environment.” Do the 
top leaders hold themselves and the organization to the 
highest ethical standards. Are those standards clearly 
understood and discussed?  
•Follow the money. if most of the work will be 
contracted out, look at specifications, procurement 
procedures and pre-bid prequalification requirements 
immediately. The last thing you need is for favored 
vendors of powerful politicos to get the work without 
fairly competing for it. And that could happen unless 
procurement regulations ensure a level playing field for 
all firms who are qualified to bid on a job (or to submit 
a written proposal in response to a request for proposals 
to provide professional services). if anyone or any firm 
now under contract wasn’t competitively procured, you 
already have a problem. 
•Empower the managing agency. You are the 
monitoring agency, not the manager. Make sure that the 
agency managers charged with making all this happen 
know they are the “owner” and need strong “owner” 
representation—that is, tough staff or owner represen-
tative under contract, and clear, demanding contract 
language throughout. 
•Define performance standards in agency mission 
and contract provisions. You’ll have a tough time 
holding agencies accountable for holding their staff 
and contractors accountable (a BiG part of your job, 
presumably) if the standards for project delivery aren’t 
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February2004: 
An aerial view  




its road deck 
just north of 
Rowes Wharf.
•Push the agency to have reliable, timely re-
porting systems. This will be your saving grace. If 
you can induce the managing agency to have a good 
reporting system for contract performance, payments, 
and change orders, you can monitor THEIR reports, 
periodically test for validity, and then go to the field to 
find out whether they’re reporting what’s really hap-
pening. There’s nothing like a big change order early in 
construction to signal problems down the road. Be sure 
to get on the distribution lists for all their routine status 
reports and minutes of public meetings. No doubt they 
will be sanitized, but you can still look for big dollar 
change orders, delays, and disputes. And, finally: scruti-
nize the assumptions underlying project cost estimates. 
The bottom line figures provided by the agency may 
include offsets and assumptions about future savings or 
aggressive cost control measures that artificially deflate 
the total project cost. Beware of creative accounting! 
•Have a steady on-site presence. Spend as much 
staff time as possible on-site and in the field. Show up at 
meetings, sit in on pre-bid conferences, talk with staff—
BE THERE. Some of our best leads come from hallway 
conversations with in-house agency staff, vendors, 
aggrieved bidders, and disgruntled employees.
CoNCluSIoNS 
In the 1980s and 1990s, public officials were all too 
willing to cede responsibility for managing public 
projects to private ventures. Particularly as we moved 
into the 1990s—with the cry for government reform, 
“steering not rowing,” outsourcing, and privatization—
state agencies were not then and probably never were 
equipped to deal with a project like the Big Dig with-
out significant reliance on private sector expertise. 
Massachusetts officials operated under the delusion that 
if they fostered a collaborative and harmonious relation-
ship with B/PB, all would be well. Surely, B/PB would 
not risk its international reputation with substandard 
performance on Boston’s megaproject. 
one need only walk along the greenway that’s grow-
ing where once the elevated Central Artery cast its 
shadow to appreciate the Big Dig’s contribution to the 
beauty of downtown Boston. The Zakim Bridge lights 
up the night and the Ted Williams Tunnel eases our 
way to logan Airport. But at what cost do we enjoy 
these marvels? For many years to come, the Big Dig’s 
$15 billion price tag will siphon state and federal funds 







I hope it 
serves as a 
reminder 
to all of us 
that when 
we cede responsibility to private entities without ensur-
ing adequate oversight, we also mortgage our grandchil-
dren’s future. our public officials—elected and appoint-
ed—have a stewardship responsibility to safeguard 
public resources. In the case of the Big Dig, some of our 
stewards fell far short of the mark. In BSC’s Master of 
Public Administration program, I have the opportu-
nity to work with my colleagues in the Department of 
Political Science to help ensure that we do not repeat 
the mistakes of the past as we move forward. 
I want to share the concluding words from my disserta-
tion. It seems a fitting end to this article:
We ask an extraordinary amount of our public leaders 
and managers. The visions of others, inherited through 
administrative changes and the vicissitudes of public 
life, may place dedicated public servants in the posi-
tion of overseeing undertakings for which they have 
neither sufficient organizational strength nor long-term 
institutional support. And yet they persevere. As we 
scrutinize, analyze, dissect, compare and contrast their 
efforts, we should acknowledge the debt of gratitude we 
owe to those dedicated professionals who work for us 
every day.  They receive too little appreciation for their 
deeds.  We owe them—and the public they serve—our 
respect and the best thoughtful attention academia has 
to offer.
Dr. Haynes notes that her fascination with the Big Dig extend-
ed beyond the walls of the Office of the Inspector General to her 
work on a doctoral dissertation on the Central Artery/Tunnel 
Project and the Boston Harbor Clean up at northeastern 
university in the Law, Policy and Society Program. 
—Wendy Haynes is Associate Professor 
of Political Science and Coordinator of the 
Master of Public Administration Program.
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